Property Rights and Incentives in Social Cooperatives

Marco Musella and Roberta Troisi
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Marco Musella: Università di Napoli Federico II
Roberta Troisi: Università di Salerno

Chapter 4 in Paid and Unpaid Labour in the Social Economy. An International Perspective, 2009, pp 47-61 from AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro

Abstract: This paper analyses Italian social cooperatives as a typical delivery service firm focusing on employee incentive systems characterized by “role tension” linked to the dual position of being employee and owner at the same time. In line with this idea, the answers to three questions: “Why to incentivise”, “What to incentivise” “How to incentivise” are searched starting from both the lack of employee’s controllability in the sector and reconstruction of the property rights which could be consistent with the characteristics of social cooperatives and with the nonprofit distribution constraint. The conclusion is that, because social cooperatives are able to structure a richer incentive set, they are more efficient in the provision of social utility services even though they pay lower wages than public organizations and for-profit firms.

Keywords: property rights; worker incentives; social cooperatives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J28 P13 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ail:chapts:03-04

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