A Generalization of the Stability of Equilibrium in a Repeated Game

Ilie Parpucea ()
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Ilie Parpucea: Babęs-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania

Chapter 11 in FindEcon Monograph Series: Advances in Financial Market Analysis, 2007, vol. 3, pp 167-178 from University of Lodz

Abstract: This chapter concerns some new theoretical aspects of repeated games, which are considered fundamental in dealing with conflict situations. Our objective is to perform a quasi-formalization of the concept of repeated game. The equilibrium is a notion that characterizes all conflict situations. Although it can be easily defined, it is not always easily discernable. The determination of equilibrium and the study of its stability become more complicated when dealing with repeated conflict situations.

Keywords: Stability; of; equilibrium; in; a; repeated; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C01 E02 F00 G00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ann:findec:book:y:2007:n:03:ch:11:mon

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