Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets

Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance and Tirza J. Angerhofer

in Cambridge Books from Cambridge University Press

Abstract: Health care costs in the United States are much higher than in other countries. These cost differences can be explained in part by a lack of competition in the United States. Some markets, such as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, have elements of monopoly. Other markets, such as health insurance, have elements of monopsony. Many other markets may be subject to collusion on prices, such as generic drugs, or wages, such as the nurse labor market. Lawful monopoly and monopsony are beyond the reach of antitrust laws, but collusion is not. When appropriate, vigorous antitrust enforcement challenging anticompetitive conduct can aid in reducing health care costs. This book addresses monopoly, monopsony, cartels of sellers and buyers, horizontal and vertical merger policy, and antitrust enforcement through private suits as well as the efforts of the antitrust Agencies. The authors demonstrate how enforcing antitrust laws can ultimately promote competition and reduce health care costs.

Date: 2022
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