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La rémunération dans les fonds d’investissement: évaluation et traitement fiscal

Dorra Najar

in Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University

Abstract: Private equity funds are a very important actor of the financial market. Their performance often exceeds the market performance. To establish a private equity fund, there are some agreements between the capital providers (limited partners) and the fund managers (the general partners). This thesis particularly treats the fund managers’ compensation granted to them for their management skills. This compensation consists of a fixed part (management fees) and a variable part indexed on the performance fund (carried interest). First, this thesis examines the various economic, cultural, specific managers’ factors ... that affect the choice of fund partners concerning compensation and profit sharing terms. Then, it studies the tax treatment problem of carried interest. The difference of taxing treatment between the United States and some European countries is explained by a difficulty in defining this financial instrument. The approximation of the carried interest to a financial option allows a better identification of the most appropriate tax treatment. Finally, this thesis proposes an estimating method of the GPs compensation fair value using Monte Carlo simulations. Varying contract clauses and optional characteristics allows a sensitivity analysis of this remuneration

Keywords: Juste valeur; Simulation; Management fees; Carried interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012 Written 2012
Note: dissertation
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