Gouvernance, détresse économique et performance des entreprises libanaises

Tarek Azzi

in Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University

Abstract: This research examines the relationship between corporate governance in Lebanon and performance in financially economically distressed companies. Working under the auspices of agency theory assumption that decline is a situation where deteriorating performance exemplifies the deviation in managerial efforts to satisfy the shareholders’ interests. Firms enter economic and financial distress as the result of economic distress, declines in their performance and poor management. The first research question focuses on the influence of declining performance on changes in the corporate governance mechanism. Relationships between corporate governance characteristics and financial distress status are examined within a sample of Lebanese firms that leads to a conclusion stating that the board of director’s characteristics explain financial distress, beyond an exclusive reliance on financial indicators.

Keywords: Détresse financière; Gouvernance; Performance; Faillite; Financial distress; Corporate governance; Performance; Bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G33 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013 Written 2013
Note: dissertation
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