Les paradis fiscaux dans la concurrence fiscale internationale
Antoine Molé
in Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine from Paris Dauphine University
Abstract:
In the framework of the growth and the internationalisation of the financial flows since the beginning of the twentieth century, Tax havens leading positions in the economic and financial environment have become so much important, that many political actors of the well developed countries have tried to assess this phenomenon through the international tax competition studies. Going further in the tax optimisation and tax planning process of the offshore sphere of activity, we can consider that far from being isolated in the sovereignty of a few countries, the offshore financial model is far integrated in the worldwide economic system, which can explain the difficulty and the different means used by the political authority to manage and stop the offshore mechanism through a by territory approach.
Keywords: Fraude fiscale; Évasion fiscale; Optimisation fiscale; Paradis fiscal; Finance offshore; Théorie des jeux; Conventions fiscales; Coopération; Rapports de force; Tax fraud; Tax evasion; Tax optimisation; Tax haven; Offshore finance; Game theory; Tax agreements; Tax cooperation; Tax competition; Harmful competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K22 K33 K34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015 Written 2015
Note: dissertation
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/15211
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