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Forecasters’ Objectives and Strategies

Marinovic, Iván, Marco Ottaviani and Peter Sørensen

Chapter Chapter 12 in Handbook of Economic Forecasting, 2013, vol. 2, pp 690-720 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter develops a unified modeling framework for analyzing the strategic behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives, competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive literature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.

Keywords: Reputational cheap talk; Forecasting contest; Herding; Exaggeration; Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecofch:2-690

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62731-5.00012-9

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