Forecasters’ Objectives and Strategies
Marinovic, Iván,
Marco Ottaviani and
Peter Sørensen
Chapter Chapter 12 in Handbook of Economic Forecasting, 2013, vol. 2, pp 690-720 from Elsevier
Abstract:
This chapter develops a unified modeling framework for analyzing the strategic behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives, competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive literature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.
Keywords: Reputational cheap talk; Forecasting contest; Herding; Exaggeration; Bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecofch:2-690
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62731-5.00012-9
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