The shapley value
Eyal Winter ()
Chapter 53 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2002, vol. 3, pp 2025-2054 from Elsevier
This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The chapter also surveys some of the literature that generalizes the notion of the value to situations in which a priori cooperation structure exists, as well as a different literature that discusses the relation between the Shapley value and models of non-cooperative bargaining. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applied side of the Shapley value, primarily in the context of cost allocation and voting.
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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