Rationality

Ken Binmore

Chapter 1 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2015, vol. 4, pp 1-26 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter is a very compressed review of the neoclassical orthodoxy on the nature of rationality on economic theory. It defends the orthodoxy both against the behavioral criticism that it assumes too much and the revisionist view that it assumes too little. In places, especially on the subject of Bayesianism, the paper criticizes current practice on the grounds that it has gone astray in departing from the principles of its founding fathers. Elsewhere, especially on the modeling of knowledge, some new proposals are made. In particular, it is argued that interpreting counterfactuals is not part of the function of a definition of rationality.

Keywords: Substantive rationality; Neoclassical economics; Revealed preference; Risk; Uncertainty; Bayesianism; Small worlds; Common prior; Common knowledge; Nash equilibrium; Equilibrium selection; Refinement theory; Nash program; B41; C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978044453766900001X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:1-26

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00001-X

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().