Coalition Formation

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra

Chapter 5 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2015, vol. 4, pp 239-326 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions†) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes a variety of solution concepts, using an umbrella model that adopts an explicit real-time approach. Players band together, perhaps disband later and re-form in shifting alliances, all the while receiving payoffs at each date according to the coalition structure prevailing at the time. We use this model to nest two broad approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three themes that receive explicit emphasis are agent farsightedness, the description of equilibrium coalition structures, and the efficiency implications of the various theories.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Blocking; Bargaining; Farsightedness; Coalition structures; Core; Stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Coalition Formation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:239-326

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00005-7

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