Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games

Rida Laraki and Sylvain Sori
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sylvain Sorin

Chapter 2 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2015, vol. 4, pp 27-93 from Elsevier

Abstract: The survey presents recent results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games and their connections with differential and continuous-time games. The emphasis is made on the following(1)A general model allows to deal simultaneously with stochastic and informational aspects.(2)All evaluations of the stage payoffs can be covered in the same framework (and not only the usual Cesà ro and Abel means).(3)The model in discrete time can be seen and analyzed as a discretization of a continuous time game. Moreover, tools and ideas from repeated games are very fruitful for continuous time games and vice versa.(4)Numerous important conjectures have been answered (some in the negative).(5)New tools and original models have been proposed. As a consequence, the field (discrete versus continuous time, stochastic versus incomplete information models) has a much more unified structure, and research is extremely active.

Keywords: repeated; stochastic and differential games; discrete and continuous time; Shapley operator; incomplete information; imperfect monitoring; asymptotic and uniform value; dual game; weak and strong approachability.; C73.C61; C62; 91A5; 91A23; 91A25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:27-93

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00002-1

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