Combinatorial Auctions

Rakesh V. Vohra

Chapter 8 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2015, vol. 4, pp 455-476 from Elsevier

Abstract: Many auctions involve the sale of heterogenous indivisible objects. Examples are wireless spectrum, delivery routes and airport time slots. Because of complementarities or substitution effects between the objects, bidders have preferences not just over individual items but over subsets of them. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This chapter surveys the state of knowledge about combinatorial auctions.

Keywords: Combinatorial auctions; Core; Vickrey auctions; Clock auctions; Package bids; D44; D47; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537669000082
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:455-476

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00008-2

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().