 Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and ModelingColin F. Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho Chapter 10 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2015, vol. 4, pp 517-573 from Elsevier Abstract: This chapter reviews recent experimental data testing game theory and behavioral models that have been inspired to explain those data. The models fall into four groups: in cognitive hierarchy or level-k models, the assumption of equilibrium is relaxed by assuming agents have beliefs about other agents who do less reasoning (i.e., some are non-strategic, and others are more strategic and understand they are playing non-strategic players). A different approach, quantal response equilibrium, retains equilibrium expectations but adds stochastic response (of which players are aware). Learning theories explain choices in games played repeatedly as a result of past actions and payoffs that were received (as in classical reinforcement) or foregone payoffs (model-directed learning). Finally, many studies reject the joint hypothesis of equilibrium expectations and optimization, along with self-interest in valuing outcomes. Social preference models have emerged to explain these data, capturing concepts like inequity-aversion, reciprocity, and social image. Keywords: Behavioral game theory; Cognitive hierarchy; Level-k; Learning; Nonequilibrium; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:517-573 DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00010-0 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications from Elsevier |
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