Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

William Sandholm

Chapter 13 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2015, vol. 4, pp 703-778 from Elsevier

Abstract: Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols. Over finite time spans the evolution of aggregate behavior is well approximated by the solution of a differential equation. From a different point of view, every revision protocol defines a map—a deterministic evolutionary dynamic—that assigns each population game a differential equation describing the evolution of aggregate behavior in that game.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Learning in games; Population games; Revision protocols; Deterministic evolutionary dynamics; Global convergence; Local stability; Nonconvergence; Stochastic processes; Dynamical systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444537669000136
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:703-778

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00013-6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().