 The Political Economy of Population AgingG. Casamatta and L. Batté Chapter Chapter 7 in Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, 2016, pp 381-444 from Elsevier Abstract: This paper reviews the latest developments in the political economy literature that are concerned with the consequences of population aging, with a primary focus on the threat posed by aging to the continued existence of public pension programs in developed countries. After briefly recalling why pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pensions are supported by a political majority in the first place, we turn to analyzing how a drop in fertility or mortality rates will change the contribution rates and pension sizes at the political equilibrium, by first assuming a constant retirement age. Other theoretical works are discussed that are mainly concerned with endogenizing the retirement age choices and exploring the opportunity to transition to a fully funded (FF) system. Empirical assessments of the relationship between a population age structure and the size of its pension programs are also presented. Keywords: Demography; Public pensions/social security; Retirement; Political equilibrium/voting; Intergenerational transfers; H55 (Social Security and Public Pensions); J11 (Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts); D72 (Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior) (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:hapoch:v1_381 DOI: 10.1016/bs.hespa.2016.07.001 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging from Elsevier |
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