Arms races and proliferation

Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator

Chapter 06 in Handbook of Defense Economics, 1995, vol. 1, pp 109-164 from Elsevier

Abstract: Previous analyses of arms races and proliferation are integrated and extended, building from a treatment of the behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and nuclear proliferation. Recent developments in economic theory are also applied here to the problems of the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the outbreak of war, yielding a deeper treatment of these phenomena by directly or indirectly treating asymmetric information in bargaining, repeated games that involve threats, and principal-agent problems in decisions on technology and weapons accumulation.

Date: 1995
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