Terrorism: Theory and applications

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler

Chapter 09 in Handbook of Defense Economics, 1995, vol. 1, pp 213-249 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior. A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. In another game model, we analyze whether two governments (nations) that are targeted by the same terrorist group would overdeter or underdeter terrorist attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that piecemeal policy, which allows the governments to share intelligence but not deterrence decisions, can be worse than no coordination. Choice-theoretic models identify substitution and complementarity possibilities among diverse modes of terrorist attacks as terrorists respond optimally to government actions. A host of time-series techniques are used to study the effectiveness of alternative antiterrorism policies. Vector-autoregression intervention procedures are particularly suited. Time-series analyses are also used to identify cycles, trends, and irregular components for forecasting purposes.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B7RKP ... 1fc645bfb8f208a05d75
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:hdechp:1-09

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Handbook of Defense Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().