Incentive models of the defense procurement process

William P. Rogerson

Chapter 12 in Handbook of Defense Economics, 1995, vol. 1, pp 309-346 from Elsevier

Abstract: Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.

Date: 1995
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