Industrial policies in the defense sector

Keith Hartley

Chapter 16 in Handbook of Defense Economics, 1995, vol. 1, pp 459-489 from Elsevier

Abstract: Voluntary military alliances, such as NATO, are often criticized for failing to exploit the opportunities for equipment standardization and free trade. However, nationalism means that governments adopt a variety of industrial policies for purchasing defense equipment, leading to departures from the competitive free trade model. Different procurement policies offer varying combinations of military and national economic benefits. Work sharing can be achieved through international collaboration, licensed production and offsets. Policies designed to improve efficiency in equipment procurement also affect the military production function. Job losses associated with the closure of military bases and defense plants raise issues of conversion.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B7RKP ... 5fccef0e8edffbf119d3
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:hdechp:1-16

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Handbook of Defense Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().