Mark Aguiar and
Chapter Chapter 11 in Handbook of International Economics, 2014, vol. 4, pp 647-687 from Elsevier
In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk-sharing, and capital flows in an environment of limited enforcement. We also discuss recent progress on default and renegotiation; self-fulfilling debt crises; and incomplete markets and their quantitative implications. We conclude with a brief assessment of the current state of the literature and highlight some directions for future research.
Keywords: Sovereign debt; Debt overhang; Default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F32 F21 F41 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intchp:4-647
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Handbook of International Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().