Political economics and macroeconomic policy

Torsten Persson () and Guido Tabellini

Chapter 22 in Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1999, vol. 1, Part C, pp 1397-1482 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simple Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.

JEL-codes: E0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (88)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy (1997)
Working Paper: Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy (1997)
Working Paper: Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy (1997)
Working Paper: Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy (1997)
Working Paper: Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy
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