The Political Economy of Government Debt

Alberto Alesina and A. Passalacqua

Chapter Chapter 33 in Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2016, vol. 2, pp 2599-2651 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy. We also discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions.

Keywords: Political economy; Optimal taxation; Budget rules; Government debt; E62; H63; H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (95)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Government Debt (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:macchp:v2-2599

DOI: 10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.03.014

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