Public Finance

Richard Tresch

in Elsevier Monographs from Elsevier, currently edited by Candice Janco

Abstract: Public Finance remains the premier textbook on the normative theory of government policy, with the third edition propelling into the twenty-first century its examination of what government ought to be doing instead of what it is doing. The welfare aspects of public economics receive extensively renewed examination in this third edition. With four new chapters and other significant revisions, it presents detailed and comprehensive coverage of theoretical literature, empirical work, environmental issues, social insurance, behavioral economics, and international tax issues. With increased emphasis on the European Union, it is rigid enough for use by PhDs while being accessible to students less well trained in math. Moves skillfully from explaining normative theory to applying it in mathematically compact and precise terms Adds new chapters on social insurance, medical care, social security pensions, behavioral public economics, and international public finance Includes new pedagogical supplements, including end-of-chapter questions and answers Emphasizes European examples

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Behavioral economics; Consumer sovereignty; Decentralized policies; Decreasing cost production; End-results equity; Externalities; Fiscal federalism; Humanism; Pareto optimality; Process equity; Public choice; Two fundamental theorems of welfare economics; Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function; Bliss point; Interpersonal equity conditions; Lump-sum redistributions; Marginal social welfare weight; Pareto-optimal conditions; Social marginal utility of income; Social welfare indifference curve; Arrow; impossibility theorem; First-best analysis; Gibbard-Satterwaithe theorem; Rawlsian social welfare function; Utilitarian (Benthamite) social welfare function; Aversion to inequality; Circulation mobility; Generalized Lorenz dominance; Gini coefficient; Hicks compensating variation (HCV); Hicks equivalent variation (HEV); Index of inequality; Lorenz curve; Okun's leaky bucket; Second-best analysis; Social expenditure functions; Social mobility; Structural mobility; Consumer externality; Consumption-production externality; Pecuniary externality; Production externality; Technological externality; Aggregate externality; Benefits-received principle; Clarke taxes; Coase theorem; Consumption externality; Free riding; Individualized externality; Lindahl prices; Mechanism design problem nonexclusive good; Pigovian tax (subsidy); Pure private good; Pure public good; Aggregate production externality; Nonconvex production possibilities; Pigovian tax; Command and control policies; Defensive strategies; Global warming; Long-lived externalities; Marketable permits; Compensated demand curve; Easy case; Hard case; Marginal cost pricing; Minimizing the deficit; Equal access; In-kind subsidy; Pareto-optimal redistribution; POUM hypothesis; Public insurance; Social status; Ability to pay principle; Haig-Simons income; Horizontal equity; Loopholes; Progressive/Proportional/Regressive taxes; Retrospective taxation (capital gains); Vertical equity; Expenditure theory; Private information; Tax theory; Underground (shadow) economy; Deadweight loss; Elasticity of taxable income; General equilibrium price models; Income effects; Inverse elasticity rule (IER); Optimal commodity taxes; Substitution effects; Distributional coefficient; General production technology; Head/poll tax (subsidy); Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); Optimal income taxation; Self-selection (incentive compatibility) constraints; Tax amnesty; Tax avoidance; Tax evasion; Balanced budget incidence; Differential tax incidence; Single tax incidence; Tax impact; Tax incidence; Computable; General equilibrium model; Dynamic tax incidence; Expenditure incidence; Lifetime tax incidence; Lorenz measures of tax incidence; Social welfare index of inequality; Sources and uses incidence; Tax concentration curve; Medical insurance; Public (social) insurance; Second-best expenditure theory; Social security pensions; Broad-based transfer payments; Credit income tax; Earned income tax credit (EITC); Samaritan's dilemma; Statistical discrimination; Targeted transfer payments; Universality; Welfare stigma; Workfare; Actuarially fair insurance; Advantageous selection; Adverse selection; Asymmetric (private) information; Co-payments; Deductibles; Expected loss; Full insurance; Medicaid; Medicare; Moral hazard; Partial insurance; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Risk premium; Social insurance; Annuity; Defined benefit pension; Defined contribution pension; Dynamic efficiency (inefficiency); Golden rule of capital accumulation; Legacy debt; Payroll tax; Social security pension; Bargaining set stability; Nonexclusive good; Boiteux problem; Inverse elasticity rule; Diamond-Mirrlees problem; Optimal commodity taxation; Production efficiency; Behavioral anomalies; Framing effects; Nudges; Present-biased preferences (self-control problems); Prospect theory; Quasi-hyperbolic discounting; Social preferences; Competition problem; Federalism; Oates' decentralization theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014 Originally published 2014-11-13.
Edition: 3
ISBN: 978-0-12-415834-4
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Book: Public Finance (2002)
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