Chapter Fifteen - Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures
Peter Hammond ()
Chapter 15 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2011, vol. 2, pp 47-151 from Elsevier
A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal consumption. This chapter begins by discussing which Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as competitive equilibria with lump-sum transfers. It also discusses existence and characterization of such equilibria without lump-sum transfers. The second half of the chapter focuses on continuum economies, for which such characterization results are much more natural, given that agents have negligible influence over equilibrium prices.
Keywords: welfare theorems; general equilibrium; core equivalence; incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:socchp:2-15
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().