Chapter Seventeen - Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

Michel Le Breton and John Weymark

Chapter 17 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2011, vol. 2, pp 191-299 from Elsevier

Abstract: This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.

Keywords: social choice; Arrow's Theorem; restricted domains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
ISBN: 978-0-444-82914-6
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:socchp:2-17

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