Institutional Competition

Edited by Andreas Bergh and Rolf Höijer

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Why is competition between institutions usually viewed in a negative light, when competition is considered positive in most other economic contexts? The contributors to this volume introduce new perspectives on this issue, analytically and empirically exploring reasons for this perception.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
ISBN: 9781847206695
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781847206695.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 The Concept of Institutional Competition

Rolf Höijer

Ch 2 A History of Thought on Institutional Competition

Roland Vaubel

Ch 3 Learning Through Institutional Competition

Michael Wohlgemuth

Ch 4 Institutional Competition: International Environment, Levels and Consequences

Peter Bernholz

Ch 5 Can Competition Between Governments Enhance Democracy?

Viktor J. Vanberg

Ch 6 Tax Competition and Tax Cartels

Rolf Höijer

Ch 7 Fiscal Competition and the Optimization of Tax Revenues for Higher Growth

Victoria Curzon-Price

Ch 8 A Race to the Bottom for the Big Welfare States?

Andreas Bergh

Ch 9 Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth in OECD Countries

Lars Feld

Ch 10 Asia’s Giants in the World Economy: China and India

Erich Weede

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eebook:12989

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this book

More books in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().