Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation
Edited by Claude Menard and
Michel Ghertman
in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
Building on Oliver Williamson’s original analysis, the contributors introduce new ideas, different perspectives and provide tools for better understanding changes in the approach to regulation, the reform of public utilities, and the complex problems of governance. They draw largely upon a transaction cost approach, highlighting the challenges faced by major economic sectors and identifying critical flaws in prevailing views on regulation. Deeply rooted in sector analysis, the book conveys a central message of new institutional economics: that theory should be continuously confronted by facts, and reformed or revolutionized accordingly.
Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
ISBN: 9781847209689
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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Chapters in this book:
- Ch 1 Transaction Cost Economics: The Precursors

- Oliver Williamson
- Ch 2 Property Rights Allocation of Common Pool Resources

- Gary D. Libecap
- Ch 3 An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications

- Pablo Spiller
- Ch 4 Incentives and Transaction Costs in Public Procurement

- Steven Tadelis
- Ch 5 From Technical Integrity to Institutional Coherence: Regulatory Challenges in the Water Sector

- Claude Menard
- Ch 6 Regulatory Governance and Sector Performance: Methodology and Evaluation for Electricity Distribution in Latin America

- Luis Andres, José Luis Guasch and Sebastián Lopez Azumendi
- Ch 7 Vertical Relations and ‘Neutrality’ in Broadband Communications: Neither Market nor Hierarchy?

- Howard A. Shelanski
- Ch 8 Deregulation, Efficiency and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry

- Magali Delmas, Michael V. Russo, Maria J. Montes-Sancho and Yesim Tokat
- Ch 9 The Achievement of Electricity Competitive Reforms: A Governance Structure Problem?

- Jean-Michel Glachant and Yannick Perez
- Ch 10 The US Postal Service

- R. Richard Geddes
- Ch 11 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act at a Crossroads

- Roberta Romano
- Ch 12 Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Rate-Making: Case Study Evidence from Commonwealth Edison and Duke Energy Rate Reviews

- Adam Fremeth and Guy L.F. Holburn
- Ch 13 Adaptation in Long-term Exchange Relations: Evidence from Electricity Marketing Contracts

- Dean V. Williamson
- Ch 14 Why and How Should New Industries with High Consumer Switching Costs be Regulated? The Case of Broadband Internet in France

- Jackie Krafft and Evens Salies
- Ch 15 The Puzzle of Regulation, Deregulation and Reregulation

- Michel Ghertman
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eebook:13188
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