The Political Economy of Central Banking

Edited by Philip Arsetis and Malcolm Sawyer ()

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: A number of the authors challenge the foundations for the growing claims that increased central bank independence will ensure, at no cost, that inflation is both lower and less variable, finding that there are significant employment costs associated with central bank independence. The authors also discuss theoretical issues, including the meaning of, and possibilities for, monetary policy in an endogenous money framework. They go on to examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. Finally, they also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in recent years and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
ISBN: 9781858987422
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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