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Law and the Limits of Government

Frank Fagan

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Why do legislatures pass laws that automatically expire? Why are so many tax cuts sunset? In this first book-length treatment of those questions, the author explains that legislatures pass laws temporarily in order to reduce opposition from the citizenry, to increase the level of information revealed by lobbies, and to externalize the political costs of changing the tax code on to future legislatures. This book provides a careful analysis which does not normatively prescribe either permanent or temporary legislation in every instance, but rather specifies the conditions for which either permanent or temporary legislation would maximize social welfare.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
ISBN: 9780857938657
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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Introduction , pp 3-9 Downloads
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Ch 2 Short-to medium-term residual effects , pp 10-34 Downloads
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Ch 3 Long-term residual effects , pp 35-57 Downloads
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Ch 4 Information and commitment , pp 58-76 Downloads
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Ch 5 Temporary tax legislation , pp 77-102 Downloads
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Ch 6 Passage probability , pp 105-123 Downloads
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Ch 7 Sponsor’s age , pp 124-136 Downloads
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Ch 8 Conclusion , pp 137-141 Downloads
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