The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions

Peter Moser

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Majority rules are generally unstable and not binding for future voters, and so are insufficient for the required security of a market economy. In this challenging book, Peter Moser argues that stability can be achieved by democratic political institutions limiting the influence of majorities.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
ISBN: 9781858989662
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