Institutions, Contracts and Organizations

Edited by Claude Menard

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world’s leading economists including Ronald Coase, Douglass C. North, Masahiko Aoki, Oliver E. Williamson and Harold Demsetz. It demonstrates the extent and depth of the New Institutional Economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
ISBN: 9781840642254
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (153)

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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 The new institutional economics

Ronald Coase

Ch 2 Understanding institutions

Douglass North

Ch 3 Institutional evolution as punctuated equilibria

Masahiko Aoki

Ch 4 A revolution in economics

Douglass North

Ch 5 Ronald Coase and the new microeconomics

Lars Werin

Ch 6 Ronald Harry Coase: international economist/institutional builder

Oliver Williamson

Ch 7 Ronald H. Coase and the emergence of a new approach to economics

Claude Ménard

Ch 8 Publications

Ronald Coase

Ch 9 Dogs and tails in the economic development story

Harold Demsetz

Ch 10 Formal versus informal institutions in economic development

Philip Keefer and Mary M. Shirley

Ch 11 Inequality, institution and differential paths of growth among New World economies

Stanley L. Engerman, Stephen H. Haber and Kenneth Sokoloff

Ch 12 When good defenses make good neighbours: a transaction cost approach to trust, the absence of trust distrust

Margaret Levi

Ch 13 Experimental economics in the bush: why institutions matter

Jean Ensminger

Ch 14 The impact of paternalism on racial land rental differences in the USA

Lee Alston and Kyle D. Kauffman

Ch 15 Institutionalized corruption and the kleptocratic state

Joshua Charap and Christian Harm

Ch 16 The state and the diversity of third-party enforcers

Yoram Barzel

Ch 17 Enforcement procedures and governance structures: what relationship?

Claude Ménard

Ch 18 The lens through which we see: the impact of ideas on institutional enforcement

Jose Alberto Garibaldi-Fernández

Ch 19 A cognitive science perspective on legal incentives

John N. Drobak

Ch 20 Quasi-integration in less-than-truckload trucking

Alberto Fernández, Benito Arru-ada and Manuel González

Ch 21 Why do the European Union's electricity industries continue to differ? A new institutional analysis

Jean-Michel Glachant and Dominique Finon

Ch 22 Ill-defined property rights in collective action: the case of US agricultural cooperatives

Michael L. Cook and Constantine Iliopoulos

Ch 23 Asset specificity, work organization and mode of command: first insights from the automotive industry

Didier Chabaud

Ch 24 Measuring the costs of exchange

Alexandra Benham and Lee Benham

Ch 25 When incomplete contract theory meets transaction cost economics: a test

Stephane Saussier

Ch 26 Incomplete contracts and governance structures: are incomplete contract theory and new institutional economics substitutes or complements?

Eric Brousseau and M’hand Fares

Ch 27 Values and governance systems

Pieter Ruys, Rene van den Brink and Radislav Semenov

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