Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Michael Finus ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pierre Courtois

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between ‘first-best’ policy recommendations and ‘second-best’ designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists’ recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
ISBN: 9781840644081
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (198)

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Book: Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation (2015)
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