The Elgar Companion to Public Economics

Edited by Attiat F. Ott and Richard Cebula ()

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
ISBN: 9781843769576
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Public Finance and the Three Branch Model

Richard A. Musgrave

Ch 2 The Empirics of the Three Branch Model

Attiat F. Ott

Ch 3 Wagner’s Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities

Alan Peacock

Ch 4 Wagner’s Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach

James Payne, Bradley Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi

Ch 5 Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why?

Attiat F. Ott and Nirupama Devaraj

Ch 6 Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey

Robert T. Deacon and Sarani Saha

Ch 7 Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa

Rita Babihuga

Ch 8 The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey

Thomas Borcherding and Dong (Dan) Lee

Ch 9 Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public Goods

Soma Ghosh

Ch 10 Economics of Conflict

Keith Hartley

Ch 11 Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data

Rati Ram

Ch 12 The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and Turkey

Julide Yildirim, Selami Sezgin and Nadir …cal

Ch 13 Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes

Lars Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner

Ch 14 Direct Democracy and Tiebout Exit

Nirupama Devaraj

Ch 15 An Extension of the Rational Voter Model

Richard Cebula and Gordon Tullock

Ch 16 A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating

Richard Cebula

Ch 17 Line Item Veto: Lessons from the Literature

David Schap

Ch 18 An Analysis of the UN Security Council Veto

Nevila Kote

Ch 19 The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation

Vladislav Dolgopolov, Bonnie Orcutt and Attiat F. Ott

Ch 20 The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models

Trufat Woldesenbet

Ch 21 What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith

Vjacheslav Dombrovsky

Ch 22 Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones

Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eebook:3537

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