The Elgar Companion to Public Choice
Edited by William Shughart and
Laura Razzolini
in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work provides a thorough account of the public choice approach to economics and politics. The Companion breaks new ground by joining together the most important issues in the field in a single comprehensive volume. It contains state-of-the-art discussions of both old and contemporary problems, including new work by the founding fathers as well as contributions by a new generation of younger scholars.
Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
ISBN: 9781852785406
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (81)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/1852785403.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable
Chapters in this book:
- Ch 1 The old and new public choice: Chicago versus Virginia

- William C. Mitchell
- Ch 2 Property rights: private and political institutions

- Louis De Alessi
- Ch 3 The logic of collective action

- Omar Azfar
- Ch 4 Social choice theory

- Michael J.G. Cain
- Ch 5 Constitutional choice

- Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
- Ch 6 Monarchies, hereditary and non-hereditary

- Gordon Tullock
- Ch 7 The anatomy of political representation: direct democracy, parliamentary democracy, and representative democracy

- Tim Sass
- Ch 8 Institutions, durability, and the value of political transactions

- W. Crain
- Ch 9 Voting

- Michael Munger
- Ch 10 On legislatures and legislative efficiency wages

- Robert McCormick and Chad S. Turner
- Ch 11 Bureaucracy

- William A. Niskanen
- Ch 12 Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance

- Kelly H. Chang, Rui J.P. de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast
- Ch 13 The Judiciary

- Gary M. Anderson
- Ch 14 Money

- Kevin Grier
- Ch 15 Ideology

- Paul Rubin
- Ch 16 Clubs and club goods

- Gary M. Anderson, William Shughart and Robert Tollison
- Ch 17 The interest-group theory of government

- Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison
- Ch 18 Rent seeking and rent extraction

- Fred S. McChesney
- Ch 19 Public choice and public choice

- Randall Holcombe
- Ch 20 Politics and the macro economy

- Richard Wagner
- Ch 21 Monetary policy

- Mark Toma
- Ch 22 The politics of government growth

- Roger Congleton
- Ch 23 Is trust in government compatible with trustworthy government?

- Dwight R. Lee and Jeff R. Clark
- Ch 24 Public choice as an experimental science

- Lisa R. Anderson
- Ch 25 The public choice approach to economic history

- Robert Ekelund and Audrey B. Davidson
- Ch 26 Law and economics

- Bruce Benson
- Ch 27 Public choice and the environment

- Bruce Yandle
- Ch 28 Institutions, Policy, and economic growth

- Gerald W. Scully
- Ch 29 Public choice and economic growth

- Randall Holcombe
- Ch 30 The international economy in public choice perspective

- Charles Rowley
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eebook:459
Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com
Access Statistics for this book
More books in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().