Game Theory and International Relations

Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt

in Books from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: At the cutting edge of current modelling in international relations using non-cooperative game theory, this collection of original contributions from political scientists and economists explores some of the fundamental assumptions of game theory modelling. It includes a theory of game payoff formation, a theory of preference aggregation, thorough discussions of the effects of interdependence between preferences upon various game structures, in-depth analyses of the impact of incomplete information upon dynamic games of negotiation, and a study using differential games. Numerous illustrations, case studies and comparative case studies show the relevance of the theoretical debate. The chapters are organised to allow readers with a limited knowledge of game theory to develop their understanding of the fundamental issues.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
ISBN: 9781852789251
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