Environmental feedbacks and optimal taxation in oligopoly

Carlo Carraro () and Antoine Soubeyran

Chapter 2 in Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources, 1996, pp 30-58 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This book covers a wide range of major issues including the legal aspects of environmental protection, environmental policy under oligopolistic conditions, voluntary agreements as a policy instrument, participation in international coalitions and environmental policy in dynamic trade models. In discussing the applications of environmental policy, it includes issues such as the profitability of emission saving techniques, water management and acid rain models.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Environmental Feedbacks and Optimal Taxation in Oligopoly (1995)
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