Reputation, Information and Confidence: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Regulation

Daniel Carpenter

Chapter 12 in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 2010 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Public choice theory sheds light on many aspects of legislation, regulation, and constitutional law and is critical to a sophisticated understanding of public policy. The editors of this landmark addition to the law and economics literature have organized the Handbook into four main areas of inquiry: foundations, constitutional law and democracy, administrative design and action, and specific statutory schemes. The original contributions, authored by top scholars in the field, provide helpful introductions to important topics in public choice and public law while also exploring the institutional complexity of American democracy.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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