Good Law and Economics Needs Better Microeconomic Models: The Case Against ‘Contingent Fees’ as Application of Agency Models to the Professions

Lorenzo Sacconi

Chapter 11 in The Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe, 2012 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This well-documented book discusses the power and limitations of class actions with insights and analysis from a panel of distinguished scholars. It pays special attention to the introduction and the applicability of such a legal device in European civil law countries. The book offers a broad legal and economic investigation, drawing insights from US judicial experience and giving a rigorous discussion of both the philosophical and constitutional aspects and the economic mechanisms and incentives set up by class actions.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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