EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Platform competition, the Apple eBooks case and the meaning of agreement to fix prices

.

Chapter 3 in The Economics of Adaptation and Long-term Relationships, 2019, pp 74-113 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Looking out on the devastation wrought by the English Civil Wars, political philosophers found themselves contemplating how to harness collective action to obviate problems of collective irrationality.With the advent of competition law more than two centuries later, American courts were situated to take up certain manifestations of collective action: those that obtain from conspiracy to restrain trade.Building on the game theory advances of 1950, economists found ways to characterize the governance of antitrust conspiracies as the mechanisms by which conspirators harness collective action among themselves to obviate, or at least mitigate, their own problems of collective irrationality (profit-diminishing competition).Characterization of the governance of conspiracies can impose structure on the meaning of agreement in the antitrust case law to unreasonably restrain trade.From a governance perspective, the district court’s analysis of agreement in the Apple eBooks price-fixing case,952 F.Supp.2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), would appear truncated.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849800372/chapter03.xhtml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:13892_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13892_3