Self-governance, property rights, and illicit commerce

David Skarbek ()

Chapter 8 in Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, 2017, pp 178-191 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The legal centrism hypothesis argues that the state is necessary to define and enforce property rights, and in the absence of state-based institutions, self-governing groups will be incapable of engaging in economic exchange and extended commercial enterprise. This chapter provides evidence against legal centrism by examining the operation of the Nuestra Familia prison gang. The gang protects inmates’ property rights and facilitates trade in contraband in California prisons, and operates an illicit business enterprise in the free world from behind prison walls. An important reason for the success of its organization is a system of information transmission mechanisms between gang members in different facilities. These mechanisms allow self-governance among people with high discount rates and criminal histories.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849801133.00015.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:13939_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla ().