Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments

Claudia Landeo

Chapter 9 in Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, 2018, pp 247-268 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In tort litigation, delayed settlement imposes high costs on the parties and society. An appropriate design of litigation institutions and tort reform requires a good knowledge of the factors that affect litigants’ behavior. Both theoretical and experimental law and economics, which represent the cornerstones of the application of the scientific method, enhance our understanding of the effects of litigation institutions and tort reform on settlement and deterrence. This chapter evaluates the interaction between theoretical and experimental law and economics in the study of tort litigation institutions. Special attention is devoted to liability, litigation and tort reform institutions, and behavioral factors that might affect an impasse. The analysis suggests a productive interaction between theoretical and experimental law and economics. In particular, findings from experimental economics work on litigation institutions indicate the presence and robustness of cognitive biases, and provide evidence of the effects of litigants’ biased beliefs on the likelihood of impasse.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849805674.00018.xml (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
Working Paper: Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions: Theory and Experiments (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:14176_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com
sales@e-elgar.co.uk

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Darrel McCalla (darrel@e-elgar.co.uk).