Crowding-in versus crowding-out of public good research

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Chapter 4 in Structuring Public–Private Research Partnerships for Success, 2016, pp 39-64 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: We explore whether private funding crowds-in or crowds-out public good research for each of two major paradigms. We emphasize the critical roles of bargaining that must necessarily take place in establishing public–private joint ventures as well as the incentives among the two agents: research administrators and private industry representatives. In addition to private sector incentives, a governance structure is specified for university research administrators. Both static and dynamic representations are developed. Crowding-in and/or crowding-out is shown to depend critically on the bargaining structure between these two parties.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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