Governance structures and collective decision making

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Chapter 7 in Structuring Public–Private Research Partnerships for Success, 2016, pp 105-130 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In this chapter, we advance a collective choice framework to interpret the selection and implementation of public–private research partnerships in the face of conflicts between private self-interest and the public interest. We isolate the political, economic, and ideological forces that emerge in the strategic interactions among the partners. This allows us to formally demonstrate the crucial role that the assignment of authority, control, or decision rights plays in the collective choice arising from PPRPs. The political power captured by each of the partners may be one of the motives for individuals or firms to join a PPRP. Quite simply, they will join the PPRP if the benefit from doing so exceeds the cost involved in the process. Other major reasons to form a PPRP may be symbolic social incentives and a commitment to collaborations that engage different types of intellectual capital.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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