Agenda Setting Power and Moral Hazard in Principal-Agent Relationships: Evidence from Hospital Budgeting in Norway

Terje P. Hagen

Chapter 17 in Fiscal Federalism and State–local Finance, 1998, pp 296-323 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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