The transfer of rights by acquisition in good faith

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Chapter 19 in The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, 2022, pp 507-510 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In a legal transaction of property, the problem arises of how to reduce and distribute the risk that the transferor is not the owner of the right to be transferred to the buyer. If this risk were generally imposed on the acquirer, the latter would have to incur high information costs for each transaction to find out whether the seller is entitled to the right. The rightsholder would however be relieved of control costs, because if the non-entitled party sells the right, the transaction is null and void. The rightful owner gets back the good and the buyer is left with a claim against the unauthorized seller, who is not seldom judgment proof. This is a one-sided and costly distribution of information costs. This chapter shows a range of possible solutions across countries and how they changed over time.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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