Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model

Raffaele Fiocco and Mario Gilli

Chapter 12 in Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, 2012 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Bringing scholars and policymakers to the frontiers of research and addressing the critical issues of the day, the book presents original important new theoretical and empirical results. The distinguished contributors include: P. Agrel, K. Alexander, J. Crémer, X. Dassiou, G. Deltas, F. Etro, L. Filistrucchi, P. Fotis, M. Gilli, J. Harrington Jr, T. Huertas, M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, V. Marques, M. Peitz, Y. Spiegel, E. Tarrantino and G. Wood.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model (2011)
Working Paper: Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model (2011)
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