 Competition policy for unilateral conduct by buyers. Chapter 5 in Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer Power, 2017, pp 117-138 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: This chapter examines the actual and potential rules that can govern abusive unilateral conduct by buyers. It reviews existing laws on both exploitation and exclusion as well as the potential remedies available for such conduct. It concludes that there are serious impediments to effective definition of standards to govern such conduct as well as to remedy it. These difficulties are especially significant when the abuse is exploitive. Exclusionary abuses are more remediable but that requires a stricter standard than is currently used. Moreover, even such remedies may not restore workably competitive buying markets. The chapter also examines the potential for structure remedies, that is, restructuring the buyer side of the market, which, while promising in theory, are both unlikely and present serious problems of defining the conduct that would justify such intervention. The conclusion is that direct remedy for unilateral abuse of dominant buyer power is very difficult and so every effort should be made to avoid allowing such power to be created. Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:15260_5 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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