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Founder status and defensive mechanisms at IPO: evidence from French firms

Asma Fattoum-Guedri and Frédéric Delmar ()

Chapter 12 in Handbook of Research on Corporate Governance and Entrepreneurship, 2017, pp 309-332 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter investigates the use of defensive mechanisms disconnecting cash flow rights from voting rights at initial public offering (IPO) by controlling shareholders. It specifically examines whether founder-chief executive officers (CEOs) are more inclined than non-founder-CEOs to implement defensive mechanisms at IPO. Building on intrinsic and extrinsic attributes distinguishing founder-CEOs from other types of CEOs, this study suggests that founder-CEOs, who are generally controlling shareholders of the company at IPO, are likely to be more anxious about a post-IPO change of control relative to non-founder-CEOs. This in turn makes them more inclined to use defensive mechanisms at IPO. Empirical support for these arguments is provided using a unique hand-collected dataset of all 467 IPOs completed in the French capital markets from 1992 to 2010.

Keywords: Business and Management; Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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