The competitive implications of facility-specific environmental agreements: the Intel Corporation and Project XL

James Boyd, Janice Mazurek, Alan Krupnick, Allen Blackman, James Boyd, Janice Mazurek, Alan Krupnick and Allen Blackman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Allen Blackman and James W. Boyd

Chapter 5 in Environmental Regulation and Market Power, 1999, pp 95-115 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Emissions taxes, tradeable emission permits and voluntary compliance policies are becoming the instruments of choice in controlling environmental problems at the national and international level. Careful design of these policies in second-best environments is a very important factor for their success. This book uses cutting-edge research in order to appraise their efficiency in varying market conditions.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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