Economic reasoning on corruption

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Chapter 4 in Corruption and Criminal Justice, 2016, pp 119-166 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Economists offer pragmatic solutions for efficient crime deterrence, and this chapter lists solutions that are of particular relevance for corruption—addressing both individual and corporate criminal liability. Economic analyses of incentives for corruption are useful for developing targeted monitoring systems, principles for sentencing, and tools for promoting self-reporting by those involved in the crime. Legal scholars, however, are often skeptical about economic solutions that are developed with the aim of deterrence alone, claiming that moral values are treated simplistically. Efforts to better understand where moral values come from—and what implications this understanding should have for criminal law strategies—are likely to improve collaboration between the disciplines and strengthen the prospects for more efficient enforcement.

Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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